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PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: PUBLIC
EDUCATION REFORM AND FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
VERNA L. WILLIAMS*

INTRODUCTION

We believe that the program challenged here is a
program of true private choice.'
With that statement, the United States Supreme Court upheld
a voucher program in the city of Cleveland that provided public funds to religious schools.2 Like many urban school systems,
Cleveland was facing an educational crisis3 that required creative
thinking, at least in the mind of the state General Assembly.4 As a
result, the state enacted the Pilot Project Scholarship Program in
1995 to improve educational offerings for the primarily low-income
students of color residing in the school district.5 From the start, the
program's use of public dollars to fund religious schools was
controversial;6 by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, well
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.S., Georgetown
University; J.D., Harvard Law School. Generous support from the Ford and Harold S.
Schott Foundations made my work possible. Thanks to my colleagues at the College of
Law, who provided very helpful input when I presented an earlier version of this paper
as part of our faculty scholarship workshop series. I am especially grateful to the
following for reviewing drafts and providing comments: Marianna Bettman, Deborah
Brake, Kristin Kalsem Brandser, Adam Feibelman, Emily Houh, Betsy Malloy, and
Wendy Parker. Kimberly Breedon provided essential research assistance. Any errors or
omissions are entirely my own. Finally, I dedicate this piece to the memory of my dear
friend, Susan J. Smith, a true feminist.
1. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
2. Id. at 653, 662-63.
3. In the context of a twenty-five-year class action lawsuit challenging racial
segregation in Cleveland schools, a district court declared a "crisis of magnitude" and
ordered the system to be placed under state control in order to enable it to comply with
the court's Remedial Desegregation Orders and Consent Order. Reed v. Rhodes, No. 1:73
CV 1300, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 1995). The Court in
Zelman does not otherwise mention this important aspect of the case, which provides
some context for the state's decision to implement a voucher program. This litigation is
discussed more fully herein. See infra Part III.C.
4. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644-45.
5. Id. at 644.
6. Almost from the beginning, the debate centered on the need to provide market
incentives to improve the failed schools and the question of whether doing so at the
expense of public schools was worth the cost. See, e.g., Richard A. DeColibus, School
Vouchers Bad Paper, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 7, 1995, at llB; Scott Stephens, School
Voucher ProposalDebated, PLAIN DEALER, May 12,1995, at 4B. Indeed, when questioned
about the difficult choice the voucher program presented for lawmakers - providing
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over 100 organizations had submitted amicus briefs weighing in on
the issue of whether this program violated the Constitution. v
vouchers for just 5,000 students out of the total 70,000 students enrolled - a city
councilwoman replied, "[y]ou save what you can." Richard Lacayo et al., Parochial
Politics: Catholic Schools Do a Good Job, But Should They Siphon Money from Public
Education? That Is the Real "Choice,"TIME, Sept. 23, 1996, at 30.
7. See, e.g., Brief of American Center for Law & Justice, Inc. & Focus on the Family,
Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175,
00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 29; Brief of Amici Curiae American
Jewish Committee, et al. in Support of Respondents, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175,
00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 122; Brief of Anti-Defamation League,
Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondents, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777,
00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 119; Brief of Amici Curiae, on Behalf of Ass'n
of Christian Schools Int'l et al. in Support of the Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos.
00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 216; Brief of the Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639
(Nos. 00-175, 00-1777,00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 18; Brief of BlackAlliance
for Educational Options as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S.
639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 30; Brief for
California Alliance for Public Schools as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
120; Brief Amicus Curiae for the Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779),
2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 104; Amicus Curiae Brief for the Center for Education
Reform in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779),
2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 32; Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Individual Freedom
et al. in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779),
2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 14; Brief of Children First America, et al., as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 110; Brief Amici Curiae of Christian Legal Society et al. in
Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 186; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Rights Union Supporting
Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 12; Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for
Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 26; Brief Amicus Curiae of
Coalition for Local Sovereignty in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 27; Brief for Council on Religious
Freedom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos.
00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 118; Brief of the NAACP Legal
Defense & Education Fund, Inc. & the Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777,
00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 123; Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat'l Ass'n of
Independent Schools in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 001777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 20; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Nat'l
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty in Support of Respondents, Zelman,
536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 121; Brief
of the Nat'l Jewish Commission on Law & Public Affairs as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 11; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l School Boards Ass'n et al. in Support of
Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 420; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l School Boards Ass'n et al. in Support of
Respondents, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 166; Amicus Brief of Ohio Ass'n for Public Education & Religious Liberty
in Support of Affirmance for Respondents, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777,
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Primary among the issues the amici curiae addressed was the
notion of choice and its importance for low-income families of color.
As explained in greater detail below, the issue of private choice was
essential to determining whether the program ran afoul of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.8 The amici, the
parties, and even the Court itself, however, examined choice in a
manner suggesting that far more was at stake: namely, the availability of educational opportunities for low-income students of color.
For example, a common refrain among the briefs was that choice9
generally is available with regard to schools - unless one is poor.
More specifically, parents of means can live in districts that have
high quality schools; even if they decide not to move out of a
troubled school district, they can afford to send their children to
private schools to get a good education. ° For poor parents, however,
such choices do not exist." In this sense, supporters of the program
argued, vouchers help to level the playing field by providing lowincome families with choices they might not otherwise have and,
correspondingly, an avenue out of the failing school districts to
which so many children are consigned. 2 The rhetoric thus framed
the voucher program as something other than a First Amendment
concern; it suggested that the program was a much needed strategy
to fulfill the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, 3 a means of
equalizing educational opportunity.' 4
00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 156; Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio School Boards
Ass'n et al. in Support of Respondents, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-

1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 146; Brief Amicus Curiae of Ira J. Paul et al. in
Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 202; Brief of The Reach Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 25; Brief for Solidarity Center for Law & Justice, P.C. as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779), 2001
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 16; Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 00-1779),
2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 10; Brief of Amicus Curiae Vermonters for Better
Education in Support of Petitioners, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (Nos. 00-175, 00-1777, 001779), 2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 24.
8. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644.
9. See, e.g., Brief of Black Alliance for Educational Options as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 7, at 2-3, 5, 22-23.
10. See, e.g., id. at 22-23.
11. See, e.g., id.
12. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Rights Union Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 7, at 11 (arguing that school choice programs, such as the one at
issue, allow "low income and minority students ... to choose schools that offer[] a sound
education, enabling them to escape a life of poverty").
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Indeed, the petitioners framed their argument as follows:
Forty-seven years ago, in Brown... this Court set forth a sacred promise
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However, what is the meaning of choice in this context? What
options truly are available to parents seeking quality education in
a school district that state assessments declare an "academic
emergency"? 5 Are the choices real when the abysmal conditions
mirror disparities that plagued the system under de jure segregation? Under these circumstances, private choice may only cement a
social order that relegates low-income students of color to the
bottom rungs of society. How can we assure that private choice
actually transforms public education? I submit that critical feminist
theory provides some answers."
of equal educational opportunities for all American school-children. Since
that ruling, we have traveled a long and often-painful [sic] distance. Along
the way, the promise has become reality for many. But for others, especially
minority schoolchildren mired in many of our nation's worst urban school
systems, that promise has been an illusion.
Taylor Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 4-5, Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (No. 00-1779),
2001 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 129.
15. Scott Stephens, GradesAre in; Results Unclear, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 16, 2005, at
Al (reporting that Cleveland schools had received a grade of "academic emergency," the
state's lowest rating for a district's progress toward meeting federal performance
standards).
16. Feminist scholars have explored the implications and significance of one aspect
of choice in public education - single-sex schooling. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The
Principle and Practice of Women's 'Full Citizenship" A Case Study of Sex-Segregated
Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 758 (2002) (arguing that "sex role
confinement"' can occur in single-sex or coeducational schooling to perpetuate inequities
based on sex, race, and class); Nancy Levit, SeparatingEquals: EducationalResearch
and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 454
(1999) (examining "empirical evidence about single-sex schools in the larger context of
sociological evidence regarding the construction of gender roles"); Denise C. Morgan,
Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the
Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 384
(1999) (identifying the "circumstances [under which single-sex public schools can]
survive an anti-subordination challenge[.]"); Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public
Education After VMI: The Case for Women's Schools, 21 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 22
(1998) (positing that single-sex public education is not per se unconstitutional); Carolyn
B. Ramsey, SubtractingSexism from the Classroom:Law and Policy in the Debate over
All-Female Math and Science Classes in Public Schools, 8 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (1998)
(arguing that all-female math and science classes do not presumptively violate the Equal
Protection Clause); Walteen Grady Truely & Martha F. Davis, Public Education
Programsfor African-American Males: A Gender Equity Perspective, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 725, 728 (1995) (examining the Black all-male academies "from a
women's educational equity perspective"); Valorie K. Vojdik, Girls' Schools After VMI:
Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 69, 70 (1997) (arguing that allgirls schools are unconstitutional); Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? SingleSex Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 15 (2004)
(arguing for an intersectional analysis of single-sex schooling); Kristin S. Caplice, The
Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 229 (1994)
("advocat[ing] public single-sex education as an alternative to coeducation"); Jennifer R.
Cowan, Note, Distinguishing Private Women's Colleges from the VMI Decision, 30
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 137, 138 (1996) (providing"a blueprint for defending [private,
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This article examines the nature of private choice in Zelman,
using the lens provided by feminist legal theory and praxis. It
argues that the rhetoric of private choice masks the fact that far too
many low-income families lack meaningful decisional autonomy to
ensure that their children get quality education. In school districts
such as Cleveland, where segregation long was the norm1 7 even
after legal battles to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination, longstanding race-based disparities persist, largely as a result of systemic
subordination. Consequently, the real choices available to innercity parents often are among many unsatisfactory alternatives, none
of which is calculated to provide the educational opportunities available to parents with economic means, irrespective of rhetoric to the
contrary. Indeed, rather than leveling the playing field, the
emphasis on choice only exacerbates the disparities that promise to
consign students of color to subordinate status. In this connection,
the discourse of private choice detracts from efforts to improve
educational opportunities substantively and create meaningful
options for low-income children of color, the true promise of Brown.
To make this case, the article is divided into three parts. Part I
discusses Zelman in greater detail, first examining the issue of
public education reform as a matter for feminist concern and then
exploring the troubling implications of the privatization of education
embodied in the choice the Court upheld. This Part notes private
choice must be interrogated carefully to ensure it does not reinforce
the subordinating social order. Part II discusses feminist legal theory concerning decisional autonomy to identify principles that may
be useful to effect social change in public education, and thus urges
the recognition of a positive right to parental autonomy grounded in
the Fourteenth Amendment and its roots in post-Reconstruction
efforts to provide Blacks 8 agency with respect to their families. Part
III then applies those principles to the context of Zelman to argue
that, in light of the district's long history of discrimination - which
it refused to remedy - the state had an affirmative obligation to
provide parents with meaningful choices that dismantled the
single-sex] colleges against [legal] challenges"). To date, however, the author knows of

no feminist scholarship on vouchers or charter schools.
17. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 711, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1976), affd in
part, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), affd, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981). See also infra

Part III.C.
18. This article uses the terms "Black" and "African American" to express that
"Blacks like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group
and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun." Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
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racially subordinating system of education. In failing to do so, the
state unreasonably interfered with the Cleveland parents' positive
right to make meaningful decisions concerning the education of
their children.
I. ZELMAN: OPPORTUNITY FOR A FEMINIST INTERVENTION

On the face of the opinion, Zelman appears to present a neutral
issue; beneath the surface, however, the decision is very much about
the existing social order and the extent to which it should change.
This both helps explain the Court's limited holding and suggests the
need for an alternative analysis that yields social change, a primary
objective of feminist legal theory. 9 The following subsections discuss
what Zelman holds for women, briefly examine Zelman, and ultimately "unpack"2 0 the significance of private choice in the context
of public education reform.
A. What's Gender Got to Do with School Choice?
While ostensibly articulating the parameters of the Establishment Clause, Zelman is ripe for feminist analysis. Public education
reforms such as vouchers reflect existing social hierarchies, which
are the subject of feminist legal theory. 2' Specifically, women raising
their children in the inner cities tend to be poor and disempowered
in some way, while women living in more affluent communities tend
to be capable of exercising more agency.22
In this context, the interlocking oppressions of white supremacy, patriarchy, and class bias conspire to limit the educational
opportunities available for low-income mothers.2 3 Reform efforts
19. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 1 (2d
ed. 2003) (observing that feminist theorists start from the premise that change is
necessary).
20. Id. at 12. Feminist scholars use this terminology, which refers to closely
examining choice to determine whether, in fact, meaningful alternatives exist for
women. See id.
21. "Feminist legal scholarship is more oppositional; it assumes there is a problem
and is suspicious of current arrangements, whether they take the form of different
standards for men and women or purportedly neutral, uniform standards that
nevertheless work to women's disadvantage." Id. at 1.
22. Cf. Twila L. Perry, Transracialand InternationalAdoption: Mothers, Hierarchy,
Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 108 (1998) (arguing for
and articulating a critical feminist analysis of international and cross-racial adoption).
23. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, approximately thirty-seven percent of all
Cleveland households with children are headed by single Black women. See U.S. Census
Bureau, American Factfinder, http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Mar. 8, 2006)
(follow "data sets" hyperlink; follow "custom table"; select "place" for Geographic type;
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currently focus on schools in low-income urban areas, where "a
disproportionate number of inadequate schools are located."24 A
privileged class status enables families who can afford better schools
to move to more affluent school districts or send their children to
private schools. As a result of white flight from the inner cities and
their schools, "35% of the poor and 43% of racial minorities attend
urban public schools" 25 that typically do not provide them with the
skills necessary to succeed on any meaningful level in society.2 6
Thus, the inequalities in funding, which in turn lead to inequities
in resources and curricula, among other things, fall more heavily on
the poor and students of color.2" Finally, patriarchy frequently is
evident in the guise of reform itself and the attendant discourse. For
example, single-sex schools - another popular choice reform have emerged as a means of teaching Black boys how to become men
and discouraging Black girls from engaging in sexual behavior,
drawing upon longstanding negative constructions of Black
masculinity and Black femininity.2" In a related vein, by focusing on
the need to discipline unruly Black children or inculcate them with
appropriate gender roles, education reform policies appear to be
ways of condemning poor parents, often single women" of color, for
lacking the capacity to raise their children appropriately.3 ° Women
select "Ohio" for State; select "Cleveland city" for Geographic area; select "Add"; select
"Next"; select "P34. Family Type by Presence and Age of Own Children"; select "Go";
select the boxes for "Families: Married-couple family; With own children under 18 years"
and "Families: Other family; Male householder; no wife present; With own children
under 18 years" and "Families: Other family; Female householder; no husband present;
With own children under 18 years"; select "Add"; return to first box to select 'T34B.
Family Type by Presence and Age of Own Children (Black Householder Alone)"; select
"Go"; select "Other family; Female householder; no husband present; With own children
under 18 years"; select "Add"; select "Next"; select "Show Result").
24. Brian P. Marron, Promoting Racial Equality Through Equal Educational
Opportunity: The Case for Progressive School-Choice, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 53, 61
(2002).
25. Id.

26. See, e.g., id. at 62-63 (citing recent research showing that "only 40% of fourth and
eighth grade students attending city schools met minimum basic standards on national
exams in reading, math, and science," compared to "two-thirds of students in suburban
and rural districts . . .
27. See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S

SCHOOLS 83-132 (1991).
28. See Williams, supra note 16, at 21-26 (examining the racial and gender
stereotypes endemic in rhetoric supporting single-sex schooling).
29. See Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 40 DUKE L.J.
274, 275 (1991) (observing that single motherhood represents a threat to the patriarchal
social order).
30. Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchyin the Meaning of Motherhood,
1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 10-11 (1993) (arguing that white supremacy and patriarchy
historically and consistently have devalued Black motherhood).
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raising their children in such circumstances lack the agency to
provide their young with meaningful access to quality educational
opportunities, which is filled with social meaning 31 of great concern
to the critical feminist project.3 2
B. Zelman: PrivateChoice to Save Public Schools?
Private choice was at the heart of the Court's analysis of
whether the voucher program violated the Establishment Clause.33
Underlying the Court's opinion, however, is the notion that the
program and private choice were necessary for the educational
benefit of poor minority children.34 More specifically, accepting the
hyperbolic question presented by petitioners at face value, it
appears that on a certain level the Court approved the voucher
program because it was "designed to rescue economically disadvantaged children from a failing public school system."3 5
The Ohio General Assembly first enacted the voucher program
in the face of a court-ordered state takeover of the Cleveland school

31. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 356, 386 (1987) (arguing for
examination of the history and context of allegedly discriminatory state actions to
determine whether they reinforce the social order).
32. The impetus for this article is my belief that feminist legal theory and praxis
should focus more on public education reform because of its importance to the lowincome women, primarily of color, who have not seen the gains of the women's
movement. My experience in practice and my recent work with the Ford Foundation
informs this conclusion. Ford is supporting a major reexamination of the reach and
efficacy of the women's movement, stemming in part from a survey commissioned by the
Center for Advancement of Women that showed a majority of women of color felt
strongly that there was a continued need for a strengthened women's movement. See
PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., CENTER FOR GENDER EQUALITY,
PROGRESS AND PERILS: How GENDER ISSUES UNITE AND DIVIDE WOMEN, PART ONE 7-8,
availableat http://www.advancewomen.org/files/File/PDFsfPartOne.pdf. As part of this
effort, the University of Cincinnati College of Law hosted a conference, "Women Coming
Together: Claiming the Law for Social Change," which addressed health care issues of
particular salience to under-served women by convening women of color from the
academy, grass roots organizations, and national public interest organizations, among
other walks of life, which provided a unique opportunity to begin national discussions
about reconceptualizing feminist legal theory and practice to be more inclusive. See
Univ. of Cincinnati College of Law & Joint Degree Program in Law & Women's Studies,
Women Coming Together: Claiming the Law for Social Change Agenda, http://www.law.
uc.edu/current/ws050225/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). This enterprise has
contributed directly to my scholarship and specifically to this article.
33. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 526 U.S. 639, 649-53, 662-63 (2002) ("We
believe the program challenged here is a program of true private choice, consistent with
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, and thus constitutional.").
34. See, e.g., id. at 644-47.
35. Taylor Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 14, at I.
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district in 1995.36 At that point, the city already had been ordered
to remedy longstanding intentional discrimination against Black
students in a class action styled Reed v. Rhodes.3 7 The district court
had issued a remedial order in 1978,38 but as of 1995, neither the
city nor the state defendants had made any progress.3 9 By 1995, the
city was in a financial crisis, in serious debt, lacking any credit or
financial credibility, and utterly incapable of taking the necessary
steps to address the myriad issues identified in the court order.4"
The district court, essentially declaring the city school system a
disaster, ordered the state to take over the finances and management
of the school district.4 ' Significantly, it is in this context of bitter
litigation charging the state and city board to remedy systemic racial
discrimination and its effects that the state enacted the voucher
program - a context the Court never mentioned in Zelman.4 2
The program, entitled the Pilot Project Scholarship Program,4 3
targeted Cleveland's public schools and allowed parents to obtain
state funded vouchers to send their children to public institutions
or private schools or to get tutorial assistance for children in public
schools.4 4 Adjacent suburban public school systems also were eligible
to participate in the program, but none did.45 Though the program
made no overt distinction or preference for religious or secular
schools, the vast majority of private schools participating in the
program (eighty-two percent) were religious in nature.4 6 As a result,
most of the students receiving and using vouchers (ninety-six
percent) were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools.4"
The Court examined the program to determine whether it had
the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.48 In this
instance, the state's purported purpose was "to enhance the educational options of Cleveland's schoolchildren in response to the
36. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 644.
37. 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981). See also infra Part III.C.

38. Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Ohio 1978), affd in part, 607 F.2d 714
(6th Cir. 1979), affd, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981). See also infra notes 216-17 and
accompanying text.
39. See also Part III.C.3. See generally Reed v. Rhodes, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 1995).
40. See also infra notes 256-57 and accompanying text. See generally Reed, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3814.
41. Reed, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814, *7-9.
42. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
43. Id. at 644.
44. Id. at 645.
45. Id. at 646.
46. Id. at 647.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 649.
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1995 takeover."4 9 Because the purpose was valid and secular, the
Court's inquiry focused on the effects of the program.5 ° In this
connection, the Court noted that its prior "decisions have drawn a
consistent distinction between government programs that provide
aid directly to religious schools .. . and programs of true private
choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a
result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals." 5 Accordingly, much of the Court's inquiry revolved around the
question of choice - that is, whether government monies went to
religious schools as a result of the parents' election or directly from
the state. In this regard, the Court held the program to be one of
true private choice and, therefore, constitutional.52 Among the
factors influencing the Court's decision were the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The program directly provided assistance "to a broad5 class
3
of individuals defined without reference to religion";
The program allowed all schools within the district to
participate, whether religious or secular;5 4
The program provided a financial incentive for adjacent
public schools to participate;55 and
There were "no financial incentives that 'skew[edl' the
program toward religious schools." 56

The Court also noted that when it considered other publicly funded
options, such as magnet or community schools, the percentage of
students enrolled in parochial schools plummeted to twenty percent,
which further demonstrated that the government was not promoting
religious schools.57
While ostensibly focused on whether the voucher program
advanced religion, the aims of the program were key to the Court's
conclusion that the program was constitutional. For example, the
Court was particularly mindful of the fact that the state's purpose
was "provid[ing] educational opportunities to the children of a failed
49. Id. at 647.
50. Id. at 649 ("There is no dispute that the program challenged here was enacted for
the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a
demonstrably failing public school system. Thus, the question presented is whether the
Ohio program nonetheless has the forbidden 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion.").
51. Id.
52. Id. at 652-53.
53. Id. at 653.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 650.
57. Id. at 659.

2006]

PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES

573

school district."5 ' Additionally, in rebutting the respondents' charge
that the state effectively was endorsing religion, 9 the Court
observed that "[a]ny objective observer familiar with the full history
and context of the Ohio program would reasonably view it as one
aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed
schools."60 The Court described the programs as "most sorely
needed" in Cleveland 6 ' and even suggested that it empathized with
the city parents who were 'looking to choose the best educational
option for their school-age children."6 2
If there were any doubts about the Court's view of the context
supporting the vouchers, Justice Thomas was even more overt in his
concurrence. He argued that states should be afforded sufficient
latitude to take the necessary steps to abate the educational
emergency confronting urban schools:
Faced with a severe educational crisis, the State of Ohio enacted
wide-ranging educational reform that allows voluntary participation of private and religious schools in educating poor urban
children otherwise condemned to failing public schools. The
program does not force any individual to submit to religious
indoctrination or education. It simply gives parents a greater
choice as to where and in what manner to educate their
children.6"
Moreover, Justice Thomas noted, the state action was calculated to
help students of color, who predominate in urban settings and
historically have lacked educational opportunities.' Justice Thomas
explained that "failing urban public schools disproportionately affect
minority children most in need of educational opportunity... Just
as blacks supported public education during Reconstruction, many
blacks and other minorities now support school choice programs

58. Id. at 653.
59. Id. at 654.
60. Id. at 655. That the "history and context" included findings of intentional
discrimination on the part of the city and state were not part of the Court's analysis is
puzzling. Those findings are relevant to why the district schools had "failed" and, as a
result, whether any meaningful choice was available to parents. See infra Part III.C.1.
See also Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. & the Nat'l Ass'n for
the Advancement of Colored People as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 7, at 8-12 (discussing the discrimination against Black students in the Cleveland
schools and urging the Court to evaluate the voucher program in light of that context).
61. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 657.
62. Id. at 660 n.6.
63. Id. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 681-82.
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because they provide the greatest educational opportunities for their
children in struggling communities.""
Justice Thomas opined that even "[i]f society cannot end racial
discrimination, at least it can arm minorities with the education to
defend itself from some of discrimination's effects."" Moreover,
Justice Thomas noted that the state's chosen vehicle was preferable
to the "other solution to these educational failures [which is] ...
racial preferences in higher education."" He went on to note that
"[c]onverting the Fourteenth Amendment from a guarantee of
opportunity to an obstacle against education reform distorts our
constitutional values and disserves those in greatest need."68
Justice Thomas went so far as to suggest that opposition to
vouchers was grounded in elitism: "While the romanticized ideal of
universal public education resonates with the cognoscenti who
oppose vouchers, poor urban families just want the best education
for their children, who will certainly need it to function in our hightech and advanced society."6 Finally, Justice Thomas opined that
65. Id. at 682.
66. Id. at 683.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 684. At least one commentator has observed that the concern about
transmogrifying the Fourteenth Amendment is ironic in light of the Court's other
decisions striking down efforts to equalize public education and assure its availability
to the neediest students. See Gary D. Allison, School Vouchers: The EducationalSilver
Bullet, or an Ideological Blank Round?, 38 TuLsA L. REv. 329, 357 (2002). According to
Allison,
[w]hat is so galling about the conservatives' crocodile tears for the plight of
poor minority students, and their insistence that vouchers are the tools of
liberation, is their complete lack of acknowledgement that conservative
United States Supreme Court majorities took away almost all other tools
that could have helped inner-city schools avoid the crises endured by the
Cleveland School District.
Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S 717 (1974) (striking down inter-district
integration effort); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (invalidating remedial plan
calling for financial upgrade of urban schools to counteract white flight); San Antonio
Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that inequalities in school
financing scheme did not violate the Equal Protection Clause)).
69. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 682 (Thomas, J., concurring). Of course, in other cases the
Court has enumerated the significance of public education to our democracy. For
example, in Brown the Court characterized public education as follows:
[It is] perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). It also should be noted that while the
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the "failure to provide education to poor urban children perpetuates
a vicious cycle of poverty, dependence, criminality, and alienation
that continues for the remainder of their lives."7 0 This truism begs
an important question that remains unanswered: Why, then, does
the state not invest its money in developing substantive reforms to
improve all public schools, rather than funding private ones,
particularly religiously affiliated private schools? "1
Two dissenting Justices commented on the policy issues that
apparently drove the Court's conclusion that the program complied
with the Establishment Clause. Justice Stevens stated outright that
"the severe educational crisis that confronted" the school district
simply was not germane to the analysis.7 Noting that the state was
embroiled in another education lawsuit, this time challenging its
system of financing public schools,7 3 Justice Stevens argued that the
Court should have given the state a chance to address Cleveland's
ills through the reform likely to result from that effort.74
Justice Souter dissented, arguing that the majority had subverted decades-long precedent concerning the meaning of "choice"
in this context. 75 According to Justice Souter, the majority misconstrued the appropriate analysis by examining the "entire menu of
possible educational placements. '7' He asserted that the Court
Court has not recognized a fundamental right to public education, see Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 33-36, it has struck down pernicious barriers to education on a variety of bases,
indicating strong support for universal education. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch.
Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 78 (1999) (holding that the Individuals with Disabilities
in Education Act requires school districts to provide certain supportive services to
disabled students as part of Congress's intent '"to open the door of public education' to
all qualified children ....");Franklin v. Gwinnett Co. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)
(recognizing a private right of action for sexual harassment under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (invalidating
a state law denying public education to children not legally admitted to the United
States, in part because of "the importance of education in maintaining our basic
institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child ....
70. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. It should be noted that, based on the figures presented by the Court, the varied
choice programs served a total of approximately 20,000 students (3700 students in the
scholarship program, 1400 students in the tutorial program, 1900 students in community
schools, and 13,000 students in magnet schools) out of the more than 75,000 enrolled in
the school system, id. at 644 (majority opinion), or about 27% of the students.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the array of choices available, the vast majority of students
were unable to avail themselves of them.
72. Id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 685 n.1 (citing DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (affirming a
lower court determination that Ohio's system of funding public education violated the
state constitution)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 698-99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
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should have inquired into "whether indirect aid to a religious school
is legitimate because it passes through private hands that can spend
or use the aid in a secular school. The question is whether the
private hand is genuinely free to send the money in either a secular
direction or a religious one." 7 7 Because the majority expanded the
choice question to include every single school available - even those
to which the voucher program did not apply - Souter suggested
that "there will always be a choice and the voucher can always be
constitutional, even in a system in which there is not a single
private secular school as an alternative to the religious school." 7 8
Moreover, Justice Souter raised important questions about the
meaning of "genuine choice" in this context:
Until now, our cases have never talked about the quality of
educational options by whatever standard, but now that every
educational option is a relevant "choice," this is what the
"genuine and independent private choice" enquiry . . .would
seem to require if it is to have any meaning at all. But if that is
what genuine choice means, what does this enquiry have to do
with the Establishment Clause? 71
Justice Souter doubted the relevance of the educational crisis upon
which the majority's opinion appears to rest, just as Justice Stevens
did. Additionally, however, assuming the crisis was relevant, Justice
Souter suggested "true choice" should require examining whether
the options really provided a meaningful alternative to the failed
schools the program purports to remedy." What is the meaning of
public choice in public education? The following subsection examines that issue.
C. "Unpacking"Private Choice in Public Education
The subtext of Zelman typifies much of the debate concerning
choice reforms; positing a market approach best promotes competition and quality in public education, particularly in the context of
failing urban schools. In this regard, programs such as vouchers or
charter schools8 1 focus on providing quality options to "promote
77. Id. at 699.
78. Id. at 700.
79. Id. at 702 n.10.
80. Id.
81. Charter schools are funded with public dollars but run by private parties. In
Ohio, these schools are called "community schools." Litigation challenging such schools
as violating the state constitution before the Ohio Supreme Court is pending as of this
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competition, and concentrate the mechanisms for evaluation and
accountability in the hands of individual parents."8 2 Thus, proponents of choice programs argue this type of reform is about increasing parental autonomy - particularly for low-income minority
parents - and promoting innovation and competition among
schools. As such, choice programs are "anchored in faith in consumer sovereignty, skepticism about experts, and the turn to plural
solutions to any dispute about substantive good." 83 Critical theorists
have questioned these premises, however, arguing that private
choice is overly atomistic and holds the promise of retrenching the
racial subordination, quite in opposition to the principles of Brown.'
Martha Minow has examined this wave of education reform and
suggests that at the heart of the debates about vouchers is the
notion that equality is antithetical to quality,8 5 which, of course, is
not the case. She cautions the rush to move away from the equalityfocused initiatives of early education reform movements threatens
the democratic and community aspects of public education. 8
Instead, Minow argues these goals, though potentially contradic8
tory, can and should be pursued in a complementary manner.
Minow characterizes the post-Brown period as one in which
"reformers identified schools as a proper setting to attack the
patterns of inequality, discrimination, and segregation that
dominated the country." ' Reformers in this equality-based reform
stage relied primarily upon the law to exert change, recognizing the
power of education to support systemic subordination. 9 The
advances won in the area of race lead to laws protecting the rights
of students based on gender, national origin, language, and ability
status,9 ° which, in turn, led to significant change in public education, albeit not to the extent advocates hoped." Minow argues the
current resistance to equality-based reforms, particularly with
respect to improving the quality of education offered to under-served
writing. See Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Ed., 822 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio
2005) (accepting appeal for review).
82. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 257, 263 (1999).
83. Id. at 264.
84. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race,
Privacy, and Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and
Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353 (2005); Minow, supra note 82, at 264.
85. Minow, supra note 82, at 257.
86. Id. at 282.
87. Id. at 285-88.
88. Id. at 272.
89. Id. at 273.
90. Id. at 276-79.
91. Id. at 279-80.
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students, is the result of backlash, persistence of biases, and the
legal successes of the movement: specifically, the attendant "[b]ureaucratic regulations, reporting requirements, and administrative
complexity [that] accompany.., recent equality initiatives. They
often seem to distract attention from or fail to advance quality
instruction."9 2
The frustration with continued inequities in urban schools,
coupled with the legal requirements that some argue impede needed
changes, helped spur quality-based reform efforts.93 As mentioned
previously, this reform movement assumes that school systems are
akin to a marketplace. Minow finds that the market-based assumptions underlying choice reforms have their limitations.9 4 Among
them is the risk of increasing segregation based on race, class, or
ability level. 5 Additionally, Minow argues the success of choice
reforms depends largely upon the ability of parents to become
informed about their choices and to be motivated to participate,
characteristics that vary widely among families and thus lessen the
potential for systemic reform.' As a result, "the choice reforms may
instead remove from existing public schools the motivated parents
who make those schools as adequate or good as they currently are.
The remaining students then will face risks even worse than they
do now." " Accordingly, quality-based reforms ultimately may result
in the diminution of quality choices for the neediest students.
Minow urges advocates to focus on the mission of public
education and commit to "reforming school reform." 9 8 In this regard,
she points to public education's emphasis on "forging commonality,
promoting civic engagement in a diverse and democratic nation, and
offering quality opportunities on an equal basis."99 The choice
movement undermines those goals:
[It] tells us to treat schooling as a matter of private consumption
rather than shared time that is formative of community and
nation. Vouchers and charters risk abandoning our longstanding
commitment to a common future. They therefore may pose the

92. Id. at 280.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

258.
265-67.
269.
268.

at 286.
at 282.
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greatest jeopardy to equality and democracy that schools have
seen in decades."°
Charles Lawrence expands
treating public education as a
abandoning public schools and,
nity,1 ' which is inimical to the
Brown:

upon these themes, arguing that
matter of private choice means
in doing so, abandoning commuprinciples the Court set forth in

The moral mandate of Brown is that all children in this country
have a right to full membership in the community and to the
community resources that membership brings. It cannot be that
this moral mandate no longer holds simply because the walls
that deny them access are built between poor black children in
urban public schools and privileged white children in private
schools and exclusive suburbs.' 2
In this connection, Lawrence argues that the current prescriptions
for school reform -

including vouchers and charter schools -

only

support existing disparities in education and, in turn, a social order
in which low-income children of color are prepared to take their
places at the lowest rungs.0 3 Therefore, in significant ways,
Lawrence submits that the privatization of education maintains the
de jure segregation outlawed in Brown, reinforcing the attendant
disparities in resources that spurred the landmark litigation in the
first place.0 4 In so doing, these "choices" ultimately deny children
of color the social capital necessary to succeed and, even more
perilously, make segregation appear inevitable and legitimate. 105 As
Lawrence notes, "[t]he genius of segregation as a tool of oppression
is in the signal it sends to the oppressors - that their monopoly on
resources is legitimate, that there is no need for sharing, no moral
requirement of empathy and care." o'
These commentators suggest that private choice in the educational context has become a means of perpetuating subordination of
already oppressed groups. Specifically, the emphasis on promoting
private choice qua private choice, though deeply rooted in our
tradition of recognizing and respecting individual autonomy, ignores
the fact that private choices tend to reflect and reinforce the existing
100. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See generally Lawrence, supra note 84.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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oppressive social order. It is from this vantage point that Dorothy
Roberts critiques the meaning of private choice in a manner that is
particularly helpful in assessing choice educational reforms.
Roberts posits the efficacy of contemporary anti-discrimination
law has been weakened by what she calls the "priority paradigm." 107
The priority paradigm is premised on the notion that "privileging
individual autonomy over social justice is essential to human
freedom."' 0 8 As a result, the fact that individual choices may result
in inequalities is deemed an unavoidable outcome, "the price we
may have to pay for freedom."' 0 9 Roberts cites the Supreme Court's
decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,"0 which struck
down a school district's plan that ignored seniority in laying off
teachers in the interest of promoting racial diversity among the
faculty, as an example."' In so doing, Roberts argues, the Court
protected white teachers' vested interests in their jobs at the
expense of remedying the school board's entrenched racism, which
enabled white teachers to have seniority in the first place." 2 Roberts
posits that by privileging white choices over the eradication of
subordination against Blacks, equality becomes an ephemeral goal,
something so unattainable that Blacks should content themselves
with a little less inequality, rather than seeking full equality."'
Roberts argues for a jurisprudence that recognizes that the
social order shapes and informs private choice." 4 In this connection:
Our task should not be to calibrate the degree of private or state
participation in acts of power, but to examine how acts of power
promote or impede citizens' freedom .... Is the state perpetuating existing hierarchies of power? Does the government's policy
further alienate historically dispossessed groups from society's
privileges? Asking such questions severely weakens the primacy
of private choices and the priority paradigm begins to crumble. "'
Thus, private choices must be understood as being inextricably intertwined with "unjust social structures." 6 As such, private choices
107. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm:Private Choices and the Limits of
Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 363, 367 (1996).
108. Id. at 370.
109. Id. at 371.
110. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Roberts, supra note 107, at 377.
Id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 395-96.
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are not merely indicators of personal preference; rather, they are
reflections of an individual's place in the social order, which
necessarily disadvantages subordinated groups. Roberts argues the
primacy of private choice translates into the rhetoric of personal
responsibility and an abandonment of laws and policies crafted to
eradicate long-standing inequality, as manifest in the continuing
disparities in well-being between whites 117
and Blacks and a failure to
see how these social issues affect us all.
Roberts urges adoption of a reformed paradigm that does not
treat liberty and equality as opposing principles."' She advocates
pursuing a "vision of justice that includes the protection of all
citizens' interest in both liberty and equality.""' 9 This vision
recognizes that liberty encompasses eliminating structural racebased subordination. In this sense, personal autonomy embraces the
needs of the individual and the needs of the community. 2 ° As
Roberts explains, this '"affirmative view of privacy recognizes the
connection between the dehumanization of the individual and the
subordination of the group.""'" Autonomy thus conceptualized is
entwined with the larger goal of racial equality. 22
Taken together, this literature suggests that, at a minimum,
private choice in public education runs the serious risk of undermining the democratic principles we hold dear and further entrenching
systemic subordination. Recognizing these dangers inherent in
private choice as currently envisioned does not mean, however, that
there is no room for privacy and autonomy in connection with public
education reform. Feminist theory and praxis, which extensively
have examined these concepts, provide a framework for seeking
reform that supports the agency of families and promotes a regime
for substantive change in which quality, liberty, and equality in
public education can coincide.
II. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY ON PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY
Feminists, like the commentators discussed in the previous
section, first approached privacy with great skepticism, arguing that
the concept has been used to constrain women's choices and
reinforce their subordinate position in society. As the commentary
117. Id. at 397-98.
118. Id. at 402-03.
119. Id. at 403.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingAddicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1490 (1991)).
122. Id.
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has developed, some scholars have argued for a more affirmative
understanding of privacy and autonomy, one that asserts positive
rights that promote women's agency. This section briefly discusses
privacy in this regard,12 3 being mindful that the uses of privacy may
have different implications, depending on the race, ethnicity, class,
124
and sexual orientation of the woman.
A. Privacy as a Shield for Subordination
Feminist legal discourse on the meaning of privacy first
emerged in connection with confronting the enforcement of separate
spheres ideology, 12 that is, the notion that a woman's place is in the
home. In this context, feminist scholarship and advocacy challenged
the notion that women should be protected from the public world by
relegating them to the home. In focusing on "open[ing] the public
sector" 121 to women, however, feminists failed to acknowledge the
racial aspects of separate spheres ideology - specifically, the laws
that limited women's ability to work in the public sector in order to
protect their procreative capacity exempted the jobs held primarily
by women of color.'27
Interrogating the social meaning of the public/private dichotomy would have required examining the construction of womanhood
embodied by the labor restrictions, which, in turn, could have provided a broader framework for challenging constraining gendered
123. A full exposition of the various ways in which feminists or other legal scholars
have examined privacy is beyond the scope of this article.
124. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critiqueof AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 145 (1989) (stating that the failure to analyze such
issues using a multiple axis "defeats efforts to restructure the distribution of opportunity
and limits remedial relief to minor adjustments within an established hierarchy");
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialismin Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
585 (1990) (criticizing feminist legal scholars for failing to consider how race intersects
with sex); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality,"
"Multidimensionality,"and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination,
6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 297 (2001) (advocating an examination of the interactions
between the myriad forms of oppression); Dwight A. McBride, Can the Queen Speak?
Racial Essentialism, Sexuality, and the Problem of Authority, in BLACK MEN ON RACE,
GENDER, AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 253, 272 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999)
("mf I am thinking about race, I should already be thinking about gender, class, and
sexuality.").
125. See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1671-74
(1997). See generally Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797
(1989).
126. Higgins, supra note 125, at 1673.
127. See generally Peggie R. Smith, RegulatingPaidHousehold Work: Class, Gender,
Race and Agendas of Reform, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851 (1999).
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and raced roles. Feminists further explored the implications of the
public/private divide in the context of domestic violence. In this
connection, scholars argued that the privacy presumed in the home
justified state refusal to intervene when men batter women.128
Accordingly, feminist scholars submit that privacy has played a
major role in women's subordination as privacy "devalues women
and their functions and says
that women are not important enough
129
to merit legal regulation."
Similarly, Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the concept of
privacy ignores the coercion that occurs between men and women.' 3
Thus, in the context of heterosexual relationships, where the Court
first recognized the fundamental right to privacy, "' 1 "consent tends
to be presumed. It is true that a showing of coercion voids the
presumption. But the problem is getting anything private to be
perceived as coercive." 13 2 MacKinnon argues that in order for the
right to privacy to be meaningful for women, it should include the
right to make decisions about sexual behavior. 3 ' This right should
start with the decision whether to have sex in the first place, which
MacKinnon posits is not available to women and is one source of
their inequality.'
This right requires state intervention.'3 5
MacKinnon concludes that the state's failure to intervene on the
basis of privacy precludes the transformative change necessary to
eradicate the subjugation of women.3 6 As a result, "the legal concept
of privacy can and has . . . preserved the central institutions
whereby women are deprived of identity, autonomy, control, and
self-definition."'3 7 According to MacKinnon, privacy doctrine is
therefore responsible for women's lack of agency.
As feminists critically examined the racial aspects of privacy
doctrine, however, they concluded that government intervention
128. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973,
976 (1991).
129. Id. at 978.
130. CATHARINE MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 93, 100 (1987). See also Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The PublicPrivate Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 252 (1987)
(observing that even in the context of marriage, a wife's consent to sex with her husband
is "publicly constructed").
131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court recognized this right in
connection with same sex couples later in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
132. MACKINNON, supra note 130, at 100.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 99-101.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
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does not always advance women's privacy interests, particularly
when the women at issue are low-income and of color. For example,
when these women become pregnant, they also become subject to a
legal regime that regards the activity of child bearing, and later
child rearing, as a public matter that justifies government intervention, and not always for the better. Dorothy Roberts writes extensively about state laws that prosecute women for using drugs during
pregnancy.' Similarly, Elizabeth Schneider highlights instances in
which women seeking assistance from their batterers end up being
prosecuted for using alcohol, while their abusers face no prosecution
whatsoever. "
Feminist legal theory thus successfully has uncovered the
harms of privacy, demonstrating how it has been used to keep
women on the margins of society, construct limiting social roles for
them, and justify norms of keeping women subordinated in all
realms of life.
B. Finding Possibilitiesin Privacy Doctrine
Some feminists have urged a reexamination of privacy as a
means of promoting women's personhood. Anita Allen, for example,
identifies ways in which privacy, as newly conceptualized, furthers
the feminist agenda, notwithstanding the well-established risks of
traditional conceptions of privacy (as discussed above). 4 ° For
example, middle-class and educated women have options today that
require them to exercise private choices, such as whether or not to
have children or delay marriage to pursue a career.' Allen submits
that "[e]ncouraging women to recognize their options, and to
exercise their options in ways that acknowledge that women's
privacy and private choice are worth something, would be an
appropriate feminist emphasis.' "'4 Similarly, in the context of
domestic violence, Allen argues that women need privacy to devise
solutions to their particular circumstances.'4 3 Shelters for women
"protect [them] by providing health services, safe companionship,
and privacy."' 44 In this sense, Allen suggests that privacy is not
138. Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrugAddicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
139. Schneider, supranote 128, at 977.
140. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 744-45, 754-57
(1999).
141. Id. at 744.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 746.
144. Id.
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always about freedom from government intervention, but rather
may entail "a claim to" something from the government.'4 5 Accordingly, rather than abandon the concept of privacy as reinforcing
women's subordination, Allen suggests that feminist theorists
recognize the elasticity of the public/private divide and "stress that
the lines between public and private should be renegotiated and
6
redrawn as necessary to further dignity, safety, and equality." 14
Dorothy Roberts urges the recognition of autonomy as essential
to the collective functioning of democracy."' In this regard, she
posits the existence of a positive right of persons dependent on the
government for obtaining information essential to their participation in society, focusing primarily on the context of reproductive
rights for poor Black women. 14 Roberts critiques the Supreme
Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan,1 49 which upheld government
regulations prohibiting health care providers in Title X-funded
reproductive health clinics from dispensing information about
abortions to their patients. 5 ° Rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the regulations, the Court held that the prohibition did not
interfere with the substantive privacy right to choose to terminate
a pregnancy; rather, the regulations merely constituted a "refusal
to subsidize a protected activity.""'5 Roberts argues the Court's
characterization embraces a Constitutional jurisprudence that
"protects only an individual's 'negative' right to be free from
unjustified intrusion, rather than the 'positive' right to actually lead
a free life."' 2
Roberts urges a jurisprudence that examines the state's
inaction and its "impact... on the status of subordinated groups..
. The critical questions become: Is the state perpetuating existing
hierarchies of power? Does the government's policy further alienate
an already-outcast community from society's privileges?" " With
this foundation, Roberts argues that rather than analyzing the
regulations from the traditional First Amendment perspective of

145. Id. at 748.
146. Id. at 750.
147. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587 (1993).
148. Id. at 590 (stating that her intention is to "articulate an affirmative government
obligation to provide abortion counseling to Title X patients" as "information necessary
for self-determination").
149. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
150. Id. at 203.
151. Roberts, supranote 147, at 601.
152. Id. at 602.
153. Id. at 605.
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whether they interfered with the marketplace of ideas"' or whether
they required patients to give up their privacy rights, 155 the Court
should have examined the extent to which the government
impermissibly restricted the flow of important information and thus
perpetuated oppression against an already subordinated group.'5 6
Applying that framework, Roberts argues that the regulations
at issue in Rust constituted an instance in which the "control of
knowledge . . . helps to maintain the existing structure of racial
domination."' 5 7 The regulations, Roberts contends, helped perpetuate the subordinating "dominant social structure, ideology and
culture," 151 just as public schooling does.'5 9 Roberts then argues for
a 'liberating constitutional vision"'6 0 that would recognize and
emphasize "ending the oppressive control of knowledge available to
the Black community and ensur[e] the [availability of] information
necessary for Black emancipation." ' Recognizing "the importance
of information for self-determination, and... plac[ing] an affirmative obligation on the government to provide this information to
people who are dependent on government funds" is key to this
162
theory.
As the foregoing suggests, critical feminist legal theories have
illumined the subordinating reality of true private choice and the
negative public consequences it can provoke. Significantly, however,
they also provide an avenue for recognizing and supporting the
agency of low-income women of color raising children by linking
privacy to autonomy and the right to have information critical for
self-determination. The next question is what implications do those
principles have for Zelman?
III. TRUE PRIVATE CHOICE UNMASKED: IMPLICATIONS FOR ZELMAN
As suggested above, the Court confronted and addressed the
fact pattern in Zelman as raising an Establishment Clause issue;
however, much more was at stake. The Court was influenced at
least in part by the state's effort to reform the abysmal condition of
the Cleveland public schools in concluding that the voucher program
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 606-12.
at 612-16.
at 616.
at 620.
at 640.
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did not unconstitutionally promote religion."'3 If, however, we place
the substandard condition of the Cleveland schools in the forefront
and examine the voucher program in the context of a school system
that, as a matter of fact and law, had discriminated against Blacks
decade after decade, 6 4 the notion of private choice takes on new
significance. It becomes clear that the options the state provided
were limited, at best, which in turn raises issues of subordination.
Viewing privacy rights through a feminist lens requires
assuring agency to subordinated groups so that choice does not reify
the social order. Examined in this light, private choice in public
education reform should be about enabling low-income families of
color to direct their children toward schooling that will improve
their lives and integrate them into society instead of perpetuate
their subjugated status. In other words, private choice must protect
the autonomy of low-income parents by providing them with
meaningful, nondiscriminatory choices concerning the education of
their children. In this connection, the relevant privacy right is
grounded in the well-established right to parental autonomy, which
is found in the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The following subsections
discuss the existing contours of this right, particularly its roots in
the abolition of slavery, which point toward a broader understanding of it as encompassing a positive right to decisional autonomy to
counter systemic subordination. Finally, this part argues that
pursuant to this conception of privacy, the state and city school
board unreasonably interfered with the autonomy of Cleveland
parents by failing to provide meaningful educational offerings.
A. Existing Doctrine Concerningthe Right to ParentalAutonomy
The fundamental right to make decisions concerning the
upbringing of one's children is well-established and long-standing.
The Court first recognized this right in the context of education,
noting, for example, in Meyer v.Nebraska,16 6 that autonomy to raise
one's children also encompasses a duty to educate them and prepare
them to be successful citizens in the future."' Two years later in

163. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44, 653 (2002).

164. See generally Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

166. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
167. See, e.g., id. at 400 (observing that this nation has "always regarded education

and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be
diligently promoted" and stating that "it is the natural duty of the parent to give his
children education").
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8
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,16
the Court struck down a state statute
requiring students to attend public schools. In so doing, the Court
reaffirmed the principle that parents have a liberty interest in
"direct[ing] the upbringing and education of children under their
control"' 16' and again emphasized the key role parents have in
readying their children for adulthood, characterizing this job as the
"high duty[] to recognize and prepare [children] for additional
obligations." 7 0 Though parental rights are not without constraints,
the Court has noted in this context that states may not interfere
with this liberty "under the guise of protecting the public interest,
by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the[ir] ... competency to effect."' 7
The Court reaffirmed parental autonomy recently in Troxel v.
Granville,'7 2 which concerned the scope of Washington's visitation
statute.173 The plurality opinion written by Justice O'Connor
celebrated this liberty interest, 174 detailing the long line of cases
17 The
since Meyer that have upheld the parental right of autonomy."
plurality specifically noted that the 'Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
76
children." 1

168. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
169. Id. at 534-35.
170. Id. at 535.
171. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
172. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
173. The statute at issue allowed "any person"' to seek visitation rights 'at any time"'
and permitted courts to grant such rights as long as visitation was in the "best interest
of the child."' Id. at 60 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2000)). In this case, the
grandparents sought extensive visitation with their deceased son's children. The mother,
who had never married the decedent, sought more limited visitation. Id. at 60-61, 71.
174. Indeed, none of the Justices disputed the continued vitality of this fundamental
liberty interest. See id. at 65-66, 78 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 86-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But
see id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to find a substantive due process right
but noting that the "right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children ....is also
among the 'other [rights] retained by the people' which the Ninth Amendment says the
Constitution's enumeration of rights 'shall not be construed to deny or disparage"').
175. Id. at 65-66 (majority opinion).
176. Id. at 66. Of course, the liberty interest is not without limits. In Troxel, the Court
held that, as applied, the statute unconstitutionally interfered with the parental right
to make decisions about one's children; the Court, however, did not address the lower
court's determination that the state may not interfere with the parental right to
decisional autonomy unless there is a showing of harm. Id. at 63, 70, 75. In this
connection, the Court chose not to articulate the "scope of the parental due process right
in the visitation context." Id. at 73. As discussed above, however, in other contexts, the
Court has suggested that states may not interfere with parental authority absent a
reasonable justification having to do with matters within the state's competency. See,
e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
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As the foregoing suggests, the Court has interpreted parental
autonomy as a negative right, that is, the right to be free from
unreasonable governmental interference. Feminist legal theory, as
discussed above, urges a closer examination of the source of this
right, the Fourteenth Amendment, and points toward a fuller
reading that encompasses a positive right to make decisions concerning one's children, free from the constraints of state-sponsored
subordination. Such a right posits a state obligation to provide
meaningful choices that promote decisional autonomy. This positive
vision of parental autonomy is perfectly consistent with and reflects
the underpinnings of the Fourteenth Amendment, a post-Reconstruction enactment designed to remove state-imposed constraints
on former slaves. The next subsection explores this aspect of
decisional autonomy in greater detail.
B. The Path Toward a Positive Right to ParentalAutonomy
As Peggy Cooper Davis has observed, the family privacy
doctrine has roots in the post-Reconstruction amendments,'7 7 which
strengthens the case for evaluating state school reform efforts with
a critical eye toward their potential for perpetuating racial subordination. Specifically, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
cognizant of and sought to eradicate state constraints on former
slaves' ability to exercise fully their human rights, which encompassed the right to have and manage one's family. 7 '
During slavery, Blacks had no rights with respect to their
children, because under that system offspring belonged to the
master - pure and simple. Children could be sold or sent to work
at other plantations in order to advance the master's economic
interest without providing notice to their parents or seeking their
consent.'79 Because the parents' first obligation was to fulfill their
duties on the plantation, they frequently were unable to provide
their children the basics in terms of attention, affection, and even
nutrition. 8 0 Slave parents could not educate their children.' When
it came to disciplining children, slaves could find themselves at the

177. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES 4 (1997).
178. Id. at 9-10.
179. E.g., id. at 91-92.
180. See, e.g., id. at 92-94. It should be noted that other adults tried to fill in for
parents, such that the community of slaves attempted to provide guidance and support
when parents were unable to do so.
181. E.g., id. at 94.
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end of the whip for taking action against their master's property.
As a result of these norms, slave children learned early on that
parents had no meaningful authority over them, which meant in
turn that parents had no power to protect them from harm or from
being sold or bound out.183 In this regard, the children were charges
of the slavery system itself, rather than of their own parents.
Abolitionists were aware of and particularly abhorred this aspect of
slavery; consequently they highlighted such abuses, hoping to help
whites identify with the plight of these parents who, like them,
loved and wanted to keep their families together."
After the Civil War and the end of slavery, states passed laws
that continued to undermine Black parental authority. For example,
under the Black Codes, 8 ' employers could take Black children and
apprentice them without getting the parent's consent.8 6 Additionally, the laws that proscribed vagrancy provided a cover for
removing Black children from their families and requiring them to
work for someone against their will, again without the parents'
consent."' Other laws proscribed educating Black children or
limited education so much as to make it unavailable. 88 Thus, even
though slavery had ended officially, states still constrained Black
parents' rights to control their children's upbringing as part of an
overall scheme to maintain Blacks' subordinate status.
Members of Congress were aware of and sought to correct these
abuses by enacting the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.189 Davis reports that lawmakers
intended to assure that former slaves were "secure in the parental
relation." 9 o Specifically, she explains that the debates in both
chambers demonstrated:

[A]s these bodies shaped the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
amendments, they were deeply affected by the widely publicized

182. See, e.g., id. at 98.
183. See, e.g., id. at 95.
184. See, e.g., id. at 105-08.
185. Black Codes were laws that the former Confederate states passed to vitiate the
effects of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 114.
186. Id. at 147-48.
187. Id. at 114-15.
188. E.g., Davison M. Douglas, The Struggle for School Desegregation in Cincinnati
Before 1954, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 979, 982, 993 (2003) (observing that Ohio law proscribed
public education for Black children until 1849, and even thereafter many localities
refused to fund Black schools, denying education through alternative means).
189. See, e.g., DAVIs, supra note 177, at 112-17.
190. Id. at 112.
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accounts of parental separations and fully responsive to the
argument that rights of family are inalienable.19'
Thus, the legislative history of these Amendments is replete with
statements concerning the significance of affording Blacks the right
of family autonomy. For example, Senator Wilson opined that
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment would "protect the
'hallowed' relations of parent and child." 9' 2 Senator Charles Sumner
made the rhetorically powerful point that even an alien from outer
space would be stunned that a democratic nation permitted a
system that denied parents' basic rights respecting their children:
[A]stonishment ... would swell to marvel as he learned that in
this republic ... there were four million human beings in abject

bondage, degraded to be chattels, despoiled of all rights, even the
... sacred right of family; so that the relation of husband and
wife was impossible and no parent could claim his own child.'93
Once it became clear, however, that the abolition of slavery did
not protect families, lawmakers continued their work, spurred by
the inequities of the Black Codes, again in large part because of
their infringement upon family rights.1 94 Thus, in debating the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, members provided protection for making and
enforcing contracts, which was, according to Davis, "understood to
encompass familial rights." ' Senator Sumner stated the legislation
must assure that newly freed slaves had the "rights 'to contract
marriage, and to make any arrangement whatever concerning their
family affairs."" 9 Finally, after enactment of the Civil Rights Act,
lawmakers proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure the
rights would be enshrined in the nation's Constitution."' The
Amendment was intended to provide former slaves with citizenship
and the protections attendant to it, including rights of family, which
lawmakers described as a key element of true freedom.1 98 For
example, consider the words of Senator Howard:

191. Id.
192. Id. at 114 (quoting Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1324 (1864)).
193. Id. at 113 (quoting Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1479 (1864)) (alterations
in original).
194. See id. at 114-16.
195. Id. at 115.
196. Id. (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 (1865)).
197. Id. at 116. Members were concerned that the Act might be struck down as
exceeding Congress's authority. Id.
198. Id. at 116-17.
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[The slave] ... had not the right to become a husband or a father
in the eye of the law, he had no child, he was not at liberty to
indulge the natural affections of the human heart for children,
for wife, or even for friend.
• . . Is a free man to be deprived of the right of ... having a
family, a wife, children, home? What definition will you attach
to the word "freeman" that does not include these ideas? The
once slave is no longer a slave; he has become, by means of
emancipation, a free man. If such be the case, then in all
common sense is he not entitled to those rights which we
concede to a man who is free?'
As Cooper's work makes clear, the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process right to family autonomy has its roots in
protecting the integrity and agency of Black families. Understood in
this light, the right to parental autonomy should be construed to
encompass a right to make decisions about one's children, free from
state-imposed constraints of systemic subjugation. Pursuant to such
a right, the state would be required to provide meaningful educational options that dismantle racial disparities, rather than choices
that merely reify them.
C. Cleveland Public Schools: Lack of Meaningful Choice as an
UnreasonableInterference with ParentalAutonomy
The foregoing suggests that in assessing the validity of Cleveland's educational reform - quite apart from the Establishment
Clause issue - the key inquiry is whether the state infringed upon
the autonomy of parents by providing limited educational offerings
resulting from a legacy of racial discrimination. 0 As explained
below, the fact that the voucher program perpetuated an inadequate
system born of racial discrimination means that the reform and the
underlying system furthered the subordination of an already
oppressed group and, therefore, unreasonably interfered with the
parents' decisional autonomy.
1. The Context: Systemic and HistoricDiscrimination
The voucher program at issue in Zelman was just the latest
effort on the part of the state to remedy abysmal conditions in
199. Id. at 117 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 504 (1866)) (alterations in
original).
200. It should be noted that this analysis also would apply to other systemic
discrimination in education, including biases based on gender or ethnicity, for example.
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Cleveland schools. In 1973,201 Black parents sued the city and state
school boards for relegating their children to segregated, inadequate
schools. °2 The plaintiffs were successful in demonstrating, as the
district court found, that de jure segregation had been in place in
Cleveland since at least the 1940s. °3 The court found that the city
intentionally established and maintained such a system, taking care
to preserve the racially-identifiable character of the schools and, as
a consequence, of the segregated neighborhoods in which they were
located. °4 For example, when a Black school was overcrowded, a
common occurrence, the school district transferred students to a less
overcrowded Black school, even though nearby white schools were
under capacity.0 5 In some instances, the school board sought and
received waivers from the state that permitted educating Black
students in over-capacity schools for 3.5 hours a day, rather than
the five hours required by law.20 6 This system of so-called relay
classes,2 ' enabled two shifts of students to attend classes in an
overcrowded building. 0 8 In other cases, the board addressed
overcrowding by transporting Black students to a nearby white
school to attend certain classes, which had the promise of integrating schools. 0 9 In reality, however, the Black students would arrive
at the white school and remain an isolated group.210 Thus, the
201. Like many states, Ohio has a long history of using education to support the
oppression of African Americans. See Reed v. Rhodes, 500 F. Supp. 404, 407-10 (N.D.
Ohio 1980), afrid, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981) (examining the historic roots of
discrimination in the state). Starting in the first half of the nineteenth century, Ohio
lawmakers outlawed educating Blacks in public schools. See Douglas, supra note 188,
at 989, 993. Later, they passed laws requiring segregation in public schools. Id. at 993.
Even after the state repealed these laws, however, segregation persisted throughout the
state, as many localities resisted complying with the law or made integration voluntary.
Id. at 1004-05. As southern Blacks migrated to Ohio in increasing numbers after the
Civil War and well into the twentieth century, opposition to integration and racial
tension increased. Id. at 1010-16. Black children confronted hostile environments when
they attended predominantly white schools. For example, "white teachers punished
white children by making them sit next to black children." Id. at 1006. Violence erupted
in other communities that attempted integration. Id. at 1009-10. By the 1970s, major
litigation challenging segregation in cities such as Dayton, Columbus, and Cleveland was
undertaken. Indeed, Douglas observes that "more school desegregation litigation was
filed in Ohio during the post-Brown era than in any other northern state." Id. at 1030.
202. Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714, 716 (6th Cir. 1979), affd, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.
1981).
203. Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 711, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1976), affd in part, 607
F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), affd, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981).
204. See, e.g., Reed, 422 F. Supp. at 726.
205. Id. at 722.
206. Reed, 662 F.2d at 1226; Reed, 607 F.2d at 730-31; Reed, 422 F. Supp. at 783 n.14.
207. Reed, 607 F.2d at 730-31.
208. Reed, 662 F.2d at 1226.
209. Reed, 607 F.2d at 731.
210. Id. at 731-32.
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bused-in Black students typically were assigned seats in the back of
classrooms away from whites; they were not allowed to participate
in activities with the white students, such as gym class or even
eating lunch.2 1 ' Finally, the court found that the school board
assigned teachers to schools on the basis of race as a means of
preserving the racial identity of the schools.2 12
The court also found that the state school board knew about and
colluded in these practices. For example, state officials discouraged
Black parents from complaining about the discrimination, invoked
procedural hurdles designed to limit the impact of their statements,
and erroneously claimed that they could merely advise parents,
rather than meaningfully address their concerns.21 When the lone
Black member of the state board introduced motions designed to
address the discriminatory conditions in the schools, those motions
failed. 1 4 The state board later ignored the state Attorney General's
legal advice that its members had a legal obligation to take
measures to correct existing discrimination in the schools, including
cutting off state funds where necessary. 1 5 The federal government
also put the state board on notice of the discrimination through
reports issued by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, which had denied Cleveland's application for emergency
funding because of racial segregation in its schools. 1 6 The U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights also issued a report on the racial
discrimination in schools. 1 7 Neither of these moved the state board
to investigate or take any other action to address the situation.
Accordingly, in 1978, the district court found both the city and state
school boards liable for intentionally discriminating against Black
students and ordered the parties to remedy the system-wide
violations.2 1 8 Significantly, the court emphasized improving the
quality of education as a key part of removing the vestiges of
discrimination.1 9
211. Id. at 732-33.
212. Reed, 422 F. Supp. at 786-87.
213. Reed v. Rhodes, 500 F. Supp. 404, 418-20 (N.D. Ohio 1980), affd, 662 F.2d 1219
(6th Cir. 1981).
214. Id. at 410-11.
215. Id. at 411-12.
216. Id. at 420.
217. Id. at 417.
218. See Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569, 571-73 (N.D. Ohio 1978), afd in part, 607
F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981).
219. Id. at 597-98 ('Remedial programs are sometimes required to overcome the
inequalities inherent in dual school systems, and when the consequences of unlawful
educational isolation linger, they must be dealt with by independent measures beyond
pupil assignment.").
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2. Implementing the Remedial Plan:Hostility and Resistance
Finding liability was only the beginning, however, as the effort
to desegregate schools evolved into a bitter struggle documented in
the nation's leading newspapers and magazines. Significantly,
financial woes figured prominently2 0 in the almost twenty-year lag
between the issuance of the court order 22 ' and actual implementation of elements of the remedial plan.2 22 Black voters initially
supported tax measures to raise money for the schools; whites
consistently voted them down.223 Two years after the court had ruled
against the city, the court held the school board in contempt for
failing to make progress toward desegregation.2 24 The court created
a new position to oversee the desegregation effort, stripping the
school board of significant authority,22 5 and appointed Dr. Donald
Waldrip, a former superintendent of schools in Cincinnati.2 2 6 In
assessing the school district at the time, the court stated that its
"'policies and actions have led to confusion and chaos in every
important desegregation-related area,"'22 7 characterizing its performance as "'abysmal"' and representing '"at best reckless conduct,
and at worst, a designed attempt to insure that desegregation
fails." 228
Even with the appointment of an expert to oversee the desegregation process, the goals of the remedial plan remained elusive.
Enrollment began to drop - from 90,000 when the litigation began21
to 80,000 in 1980 when busing started in earnest. 2" Research demonstrated that forty-one percent of white students leaving the
system did so because of busing.23 ' One year into Dr. Waldrip's tenure, budget difficulties resurfaced, prompting him to suggest that
220. Cleveland Is on the Brink: Deep Financial Problems, Political Infighting,
ScandalsAre Plaguing City Hall, Bus. WK., Nov. 20, 1978, at 129 (discussing the fact
that the city faced a deficit of $34 million and was about to run out of money).
221. See generally Reed, 455 F. Supp. 569.
222. See generally Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1533 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
223. Arthur Lubow & Robert McGruder, Ohio's Troubled Schools, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
25, 1978, at 105.
224. Dan Morgan, School Woes Are Everycity's Laid Bare, WASH. POST, July 27, 1980,
at Al.
225. Cleveland DesegregationCase, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 1980.

226. Judge Names Administratorin Cleveland Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1980,
at A6.
227. Id. (quoting Federal District Judge Frank J. Battisti).
228. Id. (quoting Federal District Judge Frank J. Battisti).
229. Cleveland DesegregationCase, supranote 225.
230. Cleveland Peacefully Buses Blacks, Whites, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1980.
231. Iver Peterson, Theory of "White Flight' Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1982,
at A14.
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the court place the school district in federal hands.23 2 Dr. Waldrip
later recommended a plan that relied on magnet schools, essentially
school choice, to desegregate the schools.23 3 The court rejected it,
stating that '"[i]t was never the court's intention that (magnet)
schools or programs be the focus of the desegregation effort."'2 4 The
court continued to spar with city officials, at one point sending the
school board president and treasurer to jail for refusing to pay for
raises and promotions of Dr. Waldrip's staff.235 The most dramatic
and troubling development occurred in 1985, when the first Black
superintendent, Dr. Frederick Holliday, committed suicide, apparently out of frustration caused by what he termed 'petty
politics." 23 6 In two years, Dr. Holliday successfully had cleared up
the budget deficit and earned the support of the community, which
voted to support a school levy for the first time in ten years.2 7 The
desegregation process, however, continued to lag, with some school
officials still failing "to read the full court order or make desegrega2 3 The court again voiced its frustration, accusing the
tion plans.""
district of '"maladministration, a form of resistance quite different
from standing in the schoolhouse door, but equally effective."'2 39 In
1987, the court "approved an Unfinished Compliance Agenda,"
which specified the actions the school board needed to take to
realize the terms of the Remedial Order.2 4 ° Five years later, the
school board still had made negligible progress, causing the court to
remark bitterly about the defendants:
[For more than a decade they displayed a recalcitrance and
hostility toward the laws of the land and the remedial orders of
this Court that not only prevented progress in this case but also
inflicted grievous wounds on the community as a whole. Of late,
no one has been heard to assert that the schools are operated in

232. Iver Peterson, Cleveland Schools Facing $45 Million Budget Deficit, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1981, at A18.
233. See Judge Rejects School Master Plan, U. PRESS IN'L, May 1, 1981.
234. Id.
235. Alan L. Adler, Cleveland School Officials Jailed,BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1981.
236. James Barron, Rescuing Cleveland Schools May Be Harder Than Ever, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1985, § 4, at 2 (quoting a note written by Dr. Holliday shortly before his
death).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (quoting Federal Judge Frank Battisti).
240. See Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 475 (6th Cir. 1999) (Cole, J., dissenting)
(quoting the district court's observance that "the Unfinished Compliance Agenda is
ample evidence of local defendant's failure to implement remedial orders over the past
nine years"').
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a satisfactory manner; to put it another way, every voice
laments the unsatisfactory condition of the school district.2 1 '
Significantly, however, the court observed that "[m]uch of the
senseless anger permeating [this litigation] has dissipated."2 42 The
parties apparently were ready to take steps to put the students first
and move forward.
3. IncrementalProgress,Finally
In 1992, the court ordered the parties to work together again to
develop a plan that would address the underlying violations and be
implemented in the 1994-95 school year. 243 The touchstone to guide
their discussions was designing a plan that would not only address
the racial imbalances, but also provide students with a quality
education,2 4 4 recognizing the link between segregation and the
inadequacies in schooling for the plaintiff class.
The parties came forward with a settlement agreement, with
the defendants proposing a student assignment plan that they
asserted would improve educational opportunities for the district's
children. 24 5 This plan, called "Phase I," was experimental in form; it
allowed students from six elementary schools to choose the school
they wished to attend. Since these schools were located in "some of
the more racially integrated neighborhoods in Cleveland, the
student bodies were naturally integrated."2'46 Buoyed by this
success, upon which all the parties agreed, the city school board
developed a larger plan, dubbed Vision 21, which featured choice as
its centerpiece. 247 Notwithstanding the considerable progress made
with Phase I, the state school board and the plaintiffs immediately
blanched at the notion of choice for the entire system: Both filed
objections with the court based on their fears that Vision 21 would
241. Reed v. Rhodes, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4723, *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 1992). The
court advised the parties that in developing a plan pursuant to the Remedial Order, they
"should focus on the improvements in the educational program and changes in the
practices of the school district that you believe will effectively eliminate the vestiges of
past discrimination ... "Id. at *8.
242. Id. at *3-4.
243. Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 475-76 (6th Cir. 1999) (Cole, J., dissenting).
244. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 869 F. Supp. 1274, 1276-77 (N.D. Ohio 1994) ("[The]
remedial orders.., were not intended to produce equal access to mediocre schools.")
(quoting the Second Supplemental Report of the Office on School Monitoring and
Community Relations).
245. See Reed, 179 F.3d at 476 (Cole, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. Id.
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result in "racially identifiable schools."2'48 The city school board
reassured these parties and the court that such would not be the
case; accordingly, they all entered into an "agreed order . . .to
implement Vision 21, including its parental choice component."24 9
As the state defendants and plaintiffs feared, within one year of
implementation Vision 21 resulted in nearly one-half of participating schools becoming racially imbalanced as defined by the terms of
the consent decree.250
Unfortunately, even while the parties were agreeing to the
design and implementation of Vision 21, other intervening circumstances threatened the program's success. Specifically, when the
district signed the agreement, it was in the throes of a severe
financial crisis. The school district had incurred $140 million in
debt, which meant it also was engaged in deficit spending "exceeding $70 million annually." 251 The district had "destroyed its credit
rating and fiscal credibility" with state and private financial
institutions.25 2 At the same time, educational quality within the
system was declining precipitously, with rates of truancy and
student dropouts on the rise and student performance on state
assessment tests on the decline.2 5' Twice the school district had
sought a levy to raise the necessary funds to implement Vision 21;
twice the public rebuffed the board in what the court termed a "lack
of confidence" vote.25 4 At this point, over twenty years into the
litigation, the district court gave the state board of education the
authority to run the school system to help get it back on track to
fulfill the terms of the Remedial Order. 255 At this juncture, the state
legislature enacted the voucher program.25 6

248. Id.
249. Id. The other components of Vision 21 included:
Comprehensive Enhancements, which called for a strengthening of the
educational foundation of Cleveland Public Schools. . . [and] Core
Enhancements, which were designed to address the fundamental injustice
of racial segregation through programs designed specifically to ensure
African-American students a quality education as measured by improved
student outcomes over a period of time....
Id. at 476 n.2.
250. Id. at 477.
251. Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1459, 1460 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1460 n.1.
254. Id. at 1462.
255. See generally Reed v. Rhodes, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3814 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
256. The school voucher program was first implemented in 1995 but was struck down
in 1999 because it violated the "Single-Subject Rule" of the Ohio Constitution. See
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ohio 1999).
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As the litigation wore on, financial problems for the school
district worsened, lessening the likelihood that the defendants
would be able to implement the ambitious goals of Vision 21. As a
result, much of the plan focused on providing student choice,
through magnet schools and the like, rather than on assuring that
racially identifiable schools were a thing of the past. By 1998, the
district was declared unitary as a matter of law,257 in large part
because racial identifiability of schools was deemed to be a matter
of private choice: that is, the parents' choice of schools and neighborhoods.2 58 The remaining disparities in achievement, which were the
target of quality reforms required by the remedial order, were
deemed attributable to socio-economic status and not the vestiges
of past discrimination.2 5 9 In his dissent, Judge Cole attacked this
notion of choice. Judge Cole observed that the district failed to
provide any meaningful choices - in this context, integrated schools
with desirable programming." He stated that "the Cleveland Board
of Education made it possible for schools to become racially
26
identifiable by directly offering parents a segregated choice." 1
4. Putting the Pieces Together: What the History Means for the
Voucher Program
The Cleveland school desegregation narrative puts the voucher
program in perspective. While this program emerged to address an
educational crisis, that crisis was undoubtedly one of the state's own
making, through hostility, resistance, and reckless maladministration, 26 2 to paraphrase the district court, in the face of over two
decades worth of orders to stop discriminating. Indeed, the program,
designed to be a cure of sorts, appears to exacerbate the substandard conditions, perpetuating longstanding racial disparities in
education and, as a result, rendering the choices available to
parents less meaningful.
Because of the state's misdeeds, parents in Cleveland had the
choice to remain in a substandard, segregated school system, or to
avail themselves of the voucher program. The public schools clearly
were an unattractive option, as evinced by its recent assessment as

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Reed, 179 F.3d at 467.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 482-83 (Cole, J., dissenting).
Id. at 482.
See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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2 6 which contributed, no
being in a state of "academic emergency,""
doubt, to the declined enrollment of 60,000 students." Surrounding
school districts that could participate in the voucher program
declined to do so,265 which is hardly surprising since they are populated with parents who sought to avoid the city schools in the first
place. Most ironic is that Black parents are not participating in the
voucher program in numbers reflecting their substantial size in the
school population. Fifty-three percent of the participants in the
voucher program are Black; twenty-nine percent are white.266 Some
reasons advanced for the lower Black participation rate include the
fact that requiring all families to contribute some portion of tuition
places private schools out of reach for the very poor and that the
private schools tend to be located closer to white neighborhoods,
making attendance a transportation issue.6 ' Finally, recent research suggests that the Cleveland voucher program has not
produced the academic achievements its proponents advertised,
resulting in lower outcomes on standardized tests for Black students
in some instances.2 6 Thus, as an option designed to enhance
opportunities for learning, the program falls short. The voucher
program has failed to improve quality for the vast majority of lowincome minority students in public schools; yet, the state plans to
expand it, thus assuring that Ohio will continue to spend more
public money on a per-pupil basis on private schools than any other
state in the nation and to be among the least generous in spending
for public schools.26 9
The state policy appears to be one of abandoning public
education, relegating families that cannot afford to move, take
advantage of even the subsidized voucher program, or otherwise
avail themselves of private schools to a grossly substandard system.
The state has failed to address the inadequacies despite over twenty
years of court supervision for its intentional racial discrimination.

263. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
264. Ellen Jan Kleinerman, Schools' Needs Are Many, Says Report - from 1917,
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 5, 2006, at B1.
265. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647 (2002).
266. Piet van Lier & Caitlin Scott, Fewer Choices,Longer Commutes for Black Voucher
Students, CATALYST FOR CLEVELAND SCHOOLS (Dec./Jan. 2001), available at
http://catalyst-cleveland.org/lO-O1/lOOlextra4.htm.
267. Id.
268. See Clive R. Belfield, The Evidence on Education Vouchers: An Application to the
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program 16-18 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the National Center for the Privatization of Public Education),
available at http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP112.pdf.
269. Scott Stephens, Private School Aid Debate Continues, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 8,
2004, at Al.
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Private choice cannot mask the fact that the abysmal condition of
the schools is related to the official decision to subordinate Black
270
students, a choice the state made at least as early as the 1940s.
Through consistent mismanagement and resistance to federal
enforcement, the state has perpetuated longstanding discrimination. In this connection, the state clearly has failed to comply with
its obligation under these circumstances to provide meaningful
options to parents and, in so doing, has violated their right to
decisional autonomy.
CONCLUSION

Applying feminist legal theory to the choices available to lowincome parents is essential to determining whether education
reform truly holds promise for meaningful social change. The
Cleveland experience demonstrates that choice has the great
potential to retrench segregation and the attendant inequities in
facilities and resources, rather than provide a lifeline toward
educational and economic well-being. As feminist theory and praxis
instruct, private choice and autonomy must and can be reconceptualized to advance social change, which means, in this instance,
holding the state responsible for attempting to repackage ongoing
subordination of low-income students of color as "school reform." As
this article has demonstrated, private choice understood as an
affirmative right to parental autonomy furthers the guarantee of
equal protection and requires much more than transparent efforts
to maintain the status quo. Rather, this positive right demands a
commitment to the principles of community and democracy
embodied in Brown and substantive educational reform that
provides both quality and equality to all the nation's children.

270. Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 711, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1976), affd in part, 607
F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979), affd, 662 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1981).

